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DAVID S. YOST*
This article examines how NATO’s purposes have changed since the end of the 
Cold War. The current Strategic Concept dates from 1999 and the allies intend to 
approve a new one at the NATO summit to be convened in Portugal in late 2010. 
The most fundamental issue in the new Strategic Concept will be the definition of 
the alliance’s essential purposes, including the core function of collective defence. 
Although the alliance has assumed many new functions since the early 1990s, the 
fundamental imperative of collective defence has persisted. However, owing in 
part to new threats and technologies, new types of collective defence and security 
challenges are at hand. The allies will have to muster political will and vision if 
they are to meet them effectively.
The historical approach to analysing NATO’s evolving purposes has been to 
draw a contrast between the alliance’s basic aims during the Cold War and the 
additional functions it has assumed since the Cold War came to an end in 1989–91. 
This article takes note of this contrast and goes beyond it by raising three questions.
First, to what extent is there a conflict or tension between the alliance’s original 
and enduring purpose of collective defence and its post-Cold War crisis manage-
ment functions? The article suggests that the dichotomy between expeditionary 
and territorial defence capabilities has been overstated. The continued develop-
ment of expeditionary capabilities is a priority for both collective defence and 
crisis response contingencies.
Second, how—and to what extent—have the allies given new meaning to 
their collective defence commitments? Without in any way abandoning the tradi-
tional meaning of collective defence (protection of the national territory of allies 
against ‘armed attack’), the allies have in some circumstances blurred the distinc-
tion between Article 5 (collective defence) and non-Article 5 missions. They have, 
for example, extended security commitments to non-allies, notably during the 
1999 Kosovo conflict; welcomed the participation of non-allies in an Article 5 
mission (Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean); and conducted a 
* The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not represent those of the Department of the Navy or any 
US government agency. An earlier version of this article appeared as a chapter in Bram Boxhoorn and David 
den Dunnen, eds, NATO’s new Strategic Concept: moving beyond the status quo? (The Hague: Netherlands Atlan-
tic Association, 2009). Thanks are owed to those who commented on earlier drafts of this article, including 
Patrick M. Condray, Rod Fabrycky, Jesse Kelso, George McCaffrey, James Clay Moltz, Kestutis Paulauskas, 
Joseph Pilat, Alberto Rosso, Michael Rühle, Diego Ruiz Palmer, Colin Stockman, and Roberto Zadra.
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nominally non-Article 5 mission (leading the International Security Assistance 
Force in Afghanistan under UN Security Council mandates) in order to prevent 
the re-emergence of an Article 5 threat. Moreover, some experts have discerned a 
tendency towards a certain ‘deterritorialization’ of the alliance’s collective defence 
mission in conjunction with the emergence of a more ‘proactive’ and  anticipatory 
concept of Article 5 requirements. Other issues also illustrate the changing dimen-
sions of collective defence—missile defence, cyber-warfare, space operations, the 
risk of state-sponsored terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
political–military dynamics in the Middle East and the Asia–Pacific region, and 
the risk of a non-Article 5 operation becoming a collective defence contingency.
Third, do the allies have the vision and political will to rise to the new challenges? 
Despite their disagreements over security priorities and the shortfalls in their 
defence efforts, with political leadership they may yet demonstrate that they have 
the imagination and determination necessary to meet their  responsibilities.
NATO’s purposes during the Cold War and after
The two main Cold War purposes of the Atlantic alliance were recalled in a classic 
formulation in the 1967 Harmel Report. The first purpose was to maintain suffi-
cient military strength to deter aggression and attempts at coercion, to defend 
the allies in the event of aggression, and ‘to assure the balance of forces, thereby 
creating a climate of stability, security and confidence’. Fulfilment of the first 
purpose—the collective defence mission expressed in Article 5 of the 1949 North 
Atlantic Treaty—would create a reliable basis for the second: ‘to pursue the search 
for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political 
issues can be solved’.1 In practice during the Cold War the second function meant 
that the NATO allies pursued dialogue and arms control negotiations with adver-
saries to the east. The allies nonetheless articulated a longer-term vision: ‘The 
ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful 
order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.’2
Since the Cold War came to an end in 1989–91, the allies have retained the 
traditional purposes of the alliance and have taken on additional roles.3 In the 1999 
Strategic Concept the allies listed five ‘fundamental security tasks’:
1 The Harmel Report, named after Pierre Harmel, a Belgian foreign minister, was formally entitled ‘The future 
tasks of the alliance’, report of the Council, ministerial communiqué, North Atlantic Council, 13–14 Dec. 
1967. The passages cited are found in para. 5. The document is available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/official_texts_26700.htm, accessed 21 Jan. 2010.
2 Harmel Report, para. 9.
3 This article focuses on the alliance’s external functions. Although NATO’s internal functions in support of 
international security and the interests of the allies may be categorized and defined in various ways, at least 
eight have been identified: maintaining US engagement in European security; resolving intra-European 
security dilemmas; reassuring Germany’s neighbours and allies; limiting the scope of nuclear proliferation 
in NATO Europe; promoting a certain ‘denationalization’ of defence planning; providing a forum for the 
coordination of western security policies; supplying economic benefits to all the allies; and encouraging and 
legitimizing democratic forms of government. For background on these internal functions, see David S. Yost, 
NATO transformed: the alliance’s new roles in international security (Washington DC: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 1998), pp. 50–72.
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•	 Security: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-
Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institu-
tions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no 
country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or 
use of force.
•	 Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington 
Treaty [that is, the North Atlantic Treaty], as an essential transatlantic forum 
for allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including 
possible developments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate 
coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.
•	 Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat of aggres-
sion against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the 
Washington Treaty.
And, in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:
•	 Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in 
conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effec-
tive conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including 
crisis response operations.
•	 Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation and dialogue 
with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing 
transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the 
alliance.4
The ambitious ‘security’ purpose, as defined above, is consistent with the Harmel 
Report vision of ‘a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by 
appropriate security guarantees’. The tasks of ‘consultation’ and ‘deterrence and 
defence’ also represent continuity with the purposes articulated by and for the 
alliance during the Cold War.
The ‘crisis management’ purpose, however, has constituted a significant depar-
ture from Cold War assumptions as to NATO’s role. Indeed, even in the 1991 
Strategic Concept, written at the beginning of the post-Cold War era, the Alliance 
declared that ‘none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence.’5 The 
allies did not anticipate that in the following year they would begin to engage 
in a wide range of demanding non-Article 5 operations in the Balkans. Opera-
tions of this kind, which the allies have also been carrying out in Afghanistan 
since 2003, have been given various names, including crisis management, crisis 
response, stabilization operations and peace operations. In these operations the 
allies have pursued what they have since 2006 called a ‘comprehensive approach’. 
This approach has involved improved marshalling of the range of crisis manage-
ment tools within NATO, plus extensive coordination with local authorities 
4 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, para. 10, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/official_texts_27433.htm, accessed 21 Jan. 2010.
5 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 7–8 Nov. 1991, para. 35, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/official_texts_23847.htm, accessed 21 Jan. 2010.
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and other international organizations, particularly the United Nations and the 
European Union, as well as a large array of non-governmental organizations and 
partner countries, including Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.6
The ‘partnership’ purpose, like that of ‘crisis management’, can be seen as 
supportive of the long-term ‘security’ vision. The allies have developed partner-
ship policies to consolidate democratic progress in post-Cold War Europe. More 
broadly, they have reached out to former adversaries and other non-NATO 
countries in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond via the Partnership for Peace, 
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul 
Cooperation Initiative and other cooperative frameworks in order to pursue shared 
political and security objectives. Through outreach, partnership and enlargement 
the allies have pursued the goal of creating what the 1999 Strategic Concept called 
‘a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe’—a phrase borrowed from the 1967 
Harmel Report.7 Moreover, partner countries have contributed substantially to the 
conduct of NATO-led non-Article 5 operations in the Balkans and  Afghanistan.
Since the end of the Cold War the allies have given NATO three additional 
functions:
•	 opposing the proliferation of WMD;
•	 supporting EU-led crisis management operations; and
•	 serving as a general ‘toolbox’ for ad hoc security operations.
The North Atlantic Council first referred to WMD proliferation as one of the 
‘new security risks and challenges of a global nature’ facing the alliance in 1990.8 
The Allies referred to WMD proliferation as a risk for ‘Alliance security interests’ 
in the 1991 Strategic Concept,9 and pointed out in the 1999 Strategic Concept 
that it ‘can pose a direct military threat to the Allies’ populations, territory, and 
forces’.10 In the same document the Allies stated that ‘The Alliance will enhance 
its political efforts to reduce dangers arising from the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and their means of delivery.’ The Allies added that, ‘By deter-
ring the use of NBC [nuclear, biological and chemical] weapons’, NATO’s forces 
‘contribute to Alliance efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of these 
weapons and their delivery means’.11 The main institutional consequences have 
been the alliance’s WMD Centre and the committees at NATO Headquarters that 
6 The allies agreed in 2006 that: ‘Experience in Afghanistan and Kosovo demonstrates that today’s challenges 
require a comprehensive approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and 
military instruments, while fully respecting mandates and autonomy of decisions of all actors, and provides 
precedents for this approach.’ North Atlantic Council, Riga summit declaration, 29 Nov. 2006, para. 10, 
available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm, accessed 7 Feb. 2010. NATO allies nonetheless 
have differing definitions of the requirements of a ‘comprehensive approach’, including the extent to which 
the allies should develop and employ civilian capabilities under alliance auspices. For background on national 
and NATO policies concerning the ‘comprehensive approach’, see David S. Yost, NATO and international 
organizations, Forum Paper 3 (Rome: NATO Defence College, Sept. 2007), pp. 19–30, 155–8, 176–83, available 
at http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/fp_03.pdf, accessed 2 July 2009.
7 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, para. 6.
8 North Atlantic Council, final communiqué, 17–18 Dec. 1990, para. 15, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natolive/official_texts_23690.htm, accessed 21 Jan. 2010.
9 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 7–8 Nov. 1991, para. 12. See also paras 11 and 49.
10 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, para. 22.
11 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, paras 40 and 41.
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deal with WMD proliferation.12 Despite the political and strategic importance 
that the allies accord to addressing WMD proliferation, they have not attempted 
to coordinate their positions on nuclear non-proliferation matters either in the 
UN or in the review conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As Roberto Zadra, the deputy head of NATO’s WMD 
Centre, wrote in 2007:
The Allies have agreed to limit themselves to the monitoring of developments, to informal 
information exchanges, and to non-binding consultations … NATO’s role in terms of 
non-proliferation efforts, i.e. political and diplomatic efforts, remains relatively small. 
Declarations from NATO Summits and Communiqués from Foreign and Defense Minis-
ters’ meetings usually emphasize the Alliance’s support for the NPT and its goals, but 
there is little measurable follow-up in terms of concrete action. These Communiqués 
are nonetheless important as they demonstrate the Alliance’s overall commitment to the 
principles and objectives of the NPT.13
The allies have supported EU-led crisis management operations since 2003. In 
terms of the formal ‘Berlin Plus’ cooperation agreements, there have been only 
two examples so far: Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia in 2003 and Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 
2004. However, there has also been some limited (and sub-optimal) coordination 
between NATO and the EU outside the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements, for instance 
in supporting the African Union in Darfur in 2005–2007, and in Afghanistan since 
NATO took over command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
in 2003. The Barack Obama administration has continued the US support for 
close NATO–EU cooperation articulated in the last years of the George W. Bush 
administration. In the words of Alexander Vershbow, the US Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for International Security Affairs:
The ideological debate over whether NATO and the European Union are complementary 
or competitive has ended. As we’ve seen in the Balkans and are seeing today in Afghani-
stan, each institution has distinct capacities that it brings to crisis management, stabili-
zation operations, and responses to threats to our economic and security interests. We 
support steps that strengthen the EU’s capacity to contribute, and we look forward to 
expanded continued close, results-oriented NATO–EU cooperation in the years ahead.14
Intractable political obstacles to more effective NATO–EU cooperation 
nonetheless persist, including disputes involving Turkey and Cyprus.15
12 The allies in 1994 established the Joint Committee on Proliferation, which is supported by the Senior Politico-
Military Group on Proliferation and the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation. The allies founded the 
WMD Centre in 2000, in conformity with decisions taken the previous year.
13 Roberto Zadra, ‘Nuclear proliferation and NATO Policy and Posture’, in Joseph F. Pilat and David S. Yost, 
eds, NATO and the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Occasional Paper 21 (Rome: NATO Defence 
College, May 2007), p. 107, available at http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/op_21.pdf, accessed 
21 Jan. 2010.
14 Alexander R. Vershbow, ‘Crafting the new Strategic Concept: ambitions, resources, and partnerships for a 
21st century alliance’, keynote speech at the ‘New challenges, better capabilities’ conference, Bratislava, 22 
Oct. 2009, available at http://nato.usmission.gov/Texts/Vershbow10222009.asp, accessed 19 Jan. 2010.
15 For background on ‘Berlin Plus’, formal and informal NATO–EU interactions and the political barriers to 
more successful NATO–EU cooperation, see Yost, NATO and international organizations, pp. 72–111. For an 
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The last of the three new functions has taken the form of miscellaneous security 
operations. Despite the widespread distaste for the term ‘toolbox’, the allies have 
in fact used their common assets in ad hoc fashion for a variety of purposes. These 
have ranged from helping to provide security for the Olympic Games in Athens in 
2004 to transporting humanitarian relief to Pakistan and the US state of Louisiana 
following natural disasters. Recent examples of such ad hoc missions include the 
alliance’s counterpiracy operations off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of 
Aden: Operation Allied Provider (October–December 2008), Operation Allied 
Protector (March–August 2009) and Operation Ocean Shield (from August 2009). 
These NATO counterpiracy operations have been pursued in support of relevant 
UN Security Council resolutions and in coordination with the actions of the EU 
and other organizations. Ocean Shield, the current operation, includes a ‘capacity-
building’ dimension—that is, helping regional states develop their own counter-
piracy abilities.16 Capacity building has in fact become an important instrument 
in the Alliance’s ‘toolbox’, with multiple examples: the NATO training missions 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, NATO training activities in the Balkans, the NATO 
military liaison mission to the African Union, and the various partnership efforts 
focused on improved capacity and interoperability.
Where does countering terrorism figure among NATO’s purposes? In both 
the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts, the allies stated that terrorism could affect 
their security interests.17 Moreover, in the 1999 Washington summit communiqué 
the allies noted that ‘Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and 
stability that can threaten the territorial integrity of States.’18 The terrorist attacks 
against the United States in September 2001 led the allies to invoke Article 5 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in history. This suggests that—in some 
cases, at least—countering terrorism could be regarded as a collective defence task 
rather than a new function for the alliance. What was new in September 2001 was 
the discovery that a non-state group could mount such a destructive attack against 
a state. This was probably not what the authors of the North Atlantic Treaty had 
in mind in 1949 when they referred in Article 5 to the possibility of an ‘armed 
attack’. The allies maintain that Operation Active Endeavour—the maritime 
surveillance effort in the Mediterranean undertaken in response to the September 
2001 terrorist attacks—is a collective defence action under Article 5, and they have 
reported it to the UN Security Council as such.19
incisive recent assessment of the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy, see Anand Menon, ‘Empower-
ing paradise? ESDP at ten’, International Affairs 85: 2, March 2009, pp. 227–46.
16 NATO, ‘Counter-piracy operations’, 22 Dec. 2009, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-D71E706D-
6CFC2B66/natolive/topics_48815.htm, accessed 21 Jan. 2010.
17 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 7–8 Nov. 1991, para. 12; North Atlantic Council, Strategic 
Concept, 24 April 1999, para. 24.
18 North Atlantic Council, Washington summit communiqué, 24 April 1999, para. 42, available at http://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27440.htm, accessed 21 Jan. 2010.
19 For background, see Yost, NATO and international organizations, pp. 55–7. As in the past, the allies generally 
regard domestic cases of terrorism as matters for their police and criminal justice authorities.
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Is there a tension between collective defence and crisis response 
 operations?
The first of the questions raised in this article has been widely canvassed. To what 
extent is there a conflict or tension between the alliance’s original and enduring 
purpose of collective defence and its newer crisis management functions?
This question has been formulated in various ways. For example, some observers 
have asked what the balance should be between preparations for Article 5 collective 
defence missions and conducting non-Article 5 operations, such as crisis response, 
peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and stabilization and reconstruction. 
Some allied observers, notably in Poland and the Baltic states, have suggested that 
the alliance’s focus of attention has in recent years been too heavily tilted towards 
non-Article 5 operations and that Russia could in some circumstances become 
a more fundamental and existential threat than the Taleban or Al-Qaeda. Some 
allied observers in Italy, Spain and other nations on the Mediterranean littoral 
have, however, emphasized the advantages of expeditionary capabilities that could 
counter the potential emergence of asymmetric challenges in Africa or the Middle 
East. Canadian, Danish and Norwegian observers have noted the relevance of 
expeditionary capabilities for the protection of the national interests of allies in 
the ‘High North’.20 Various analysts have discerned tendencies towards ‘fragmen-
tation’ or a ‘multi-tier’ pattern among the allies. Some allies (such as Canada, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) are regarded as being more 
focused on NATO crisis response and distant ‘comprehensive approach’ opera-
tions in partnership with the EU and the UN, while others (such as the Baltic 
states, the Czech Republic, Poland and Turkey) are viewed as being more preoc-
cupied with collective defence.21
To what extent is there a contradiction between transforming forces for expedi-
tionary operations and sustaining preparedness for territorial defence? To some 
extent, this is an ill-framed debate. Some capabilities, such as static air defences, 
fuel pipelines and fortified barriers, are indeed expressly designed for territorial 
defence. Moreover, resources are finite; and forces committed to operations in 
Afghanistan and other countries distant from NATO national homelands are 
obviously not on duty for immediate territorial defence. The home base must 
nonetheless be secure in order to support expeditionary power projection. The 
authors of a recent report in Washington came up with a concise formula to make 
this point: ‘If NATO cannot protect, it cannot project.’22
20 See esp. ‘The Norwegian government’s High North strategy’, published 21 Feb. 2007, available at http://
www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-action-and-plans/Action-plans-and-
programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697, accessed 6 July 2009; Sven G. Holtsmark 
and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, eds, Security prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze?, Forum Paper 
7 (Rome: NATO Defense College, May 2009), available at http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/
fp_07.pdf, accessed 6 July 2009.
21 See, among other sources, Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, ‘Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlan-
tic alliance and the process of strategic change’, International Affairs 85: 2, March 2009, pp. 211–26.
22 Daniel Hamilton, with Charles Barry, Hans Binnendijk, Stephen Flanagan, Julianne Smith and James 
Townsend, Alliance reborn: an Atlantic compact for the 21st century (Washington DC: Atlantic Council of the 
United States; Center for Strategic and International Studies; Center for Technology and National  Security 
Policy, National Defense University; and Center for Transatlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of 
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Forces capable of conducting expeditionary operations may also be better 
equipped to undertake collective defence missions. During the Cold War, most 
of the allies planned to ‘fight in place’ rather than to project troops or firepower at 
great distances. Only a few countries, including Canada and the United Kingdom, 
were prepared to assist the United States with their own dedicated airlift in tasks 
such as reinforcing Denmark, northern Greece, northern Italy, northern Norway 
and eastern Turkey.23
The alliance has expanded from 16 countries at the end of the Cold War 
to 28 countries today; and some of these countries cannot be defended unless 
their allies are prepared to project power. In other words, NATO today needs 
improved expeditionary capabilities not only for crisis response operations distant 
from alliance territory but also for collective defence itself. This means investing 
in airlift and other ‘strategic mobility’ logistical assets, mobile communications 
networks, combat support and combat service support.24 The allies must be able 
to project capabilities to every part of the significantly enlarged treaty area. For 
collective defence and deterrence, they need agile and rapidly deployable forces 
and high-readiness headquarters.
Lack of agreement on definitions may account for some perceptions of a 
dichotomy between capabilities suitable for collective or territorial defence, on 
the one hand, and for expeditionary or crisis response operations, on the other. 
Some terminological purists hold that ‘expeditionary operations’ are by  definition 
outside NATO territory and that territorial defence means responding to direct 
attacks against an ally’s territory. Policy-makers do not, however, respect these 
distinctions in discussing NATO’s capability requirements. In October 2009, for 
example, Vershbow said: ‘We’re familiar by now with some of the biggest  obstacles 
the alliance faces in having deployable expeditionary forces that can do both terri-
torial defence and missions beyond Allied territory.’25 In a speech at the same 
event, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the NATO Secretary General, said: ‘We must 
also realize that territorial defence very often starts far from our own borders, 
like in Afghanistan.’26
The essential point about ‘expeditionary’ operations is that they require 
movement at ‘strategic distance’. For Canada and the United States, for example, 
any force deployment to Europe, whether for the territorial defence of an ally or 
for crisis response beyond allied territory, is an expeditionary operation. NATO’s 
2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance called for ‘the ability to conduct and 
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Feb. 2009), p. 22.
23 Sean M. Maloney, ‘Fire brigade or tocsin? NATO’s ACE mobile force, flexible response and the Cold War’, 
Journal of Strategic Studies 27: 4, Dec. 2004, p. 602.
24 Combat support consists of units providing fire support (e.g. artillery and close air support) and other opera-
tional assistance to combat forces, while combat service support provides supplies, maintenance, transport, 
medical care and other essential services. This distinction is reflected in the NATO glossary of terms and defini-
tions, AAP-6 (2009) (Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency, 2009), p. 2-C-9, available at http://www.nato.
int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap-6–2009.pdf, accessed 6 Feb. 2010.
25 Vershbow, ‘Crafting the new Strategic Concept’.
26 Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the ‘New challenges, better capabilities’ 
conference, Bratislava, 22 Oct. 2009, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_58248.htm, 
accessed 6 Feb. 2010.
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support multinational joint expeditionary operations far from home territory 
with little or no host nation support and to sustain them for extended periods’.27 
Although host nation support might well be available for collective defence, many 
of the other requirements for the movement of forces from the Atlantic seaboard 
(e.g. from the United Kingdom or France or Portugal or Spain) to the Baltic states 
or Poland or eastern Turkey or northern Norway would amount to those needed 
for an expeditionary operation, including strategic mobility and logistical assets, 
and command, control and communications. In other words, crisis response and 
collective defence capability requirements overlap to a considerable extent.
Moreover, expeditionary operations—that is, missions at ‘strategic distance’—
can provide training and experience relevant to possible Article 5 endeavours. The 
more the allies demonstrate their ability to conduct demanding non-Article 5 tasks 
at strategic range—for instance, in the Balkans (which are distant from some allies) 
and Afghanistan—successfully, the more they should feel able to rely on each 
other in an Article 5 contingency.
Conversely, given the need to curtail casualties in military operations, partic-
ularly in what are widely seen as ‘optional’ crisis response and peace support 
operations, the alliance needs to maintain capabilities to perform such opera-
tions with minimal risks. The political sustainability of non-Article 5 opera-
tions depends on reducing the risk of incurring casualties, and this necessitates 
an ability to dominate the field in crisis contingencies. In other words, practical 
factors—including the need to be able to counter asymmetric threats—justify the 
maintenance of a substantial conventional military posture, even when large-scale 
collective defence contingencies appear remote.
While non-Article 5 operations have taken up increasing proportions of the time 
and attention of the alliance’s military and civilian personnel in their day-to-day 
activities, the allies have continued to uphold the primacy of collective defence. 
According to the November 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance, ‘Collective 
defence will remain the core purpose of the Alliance.’28 Collective defence is the 
ultimate reason why the founder members formed the alliance in 1949; and it 
remains NATO’s cornerstone, even as the alliance has taken on additional roles 
and responsibilities.
Current policies and activities relevant to Article 5 include Operation Active 
Endeavour; the Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism; the alliance’s 
nuclear deterrence posture;29 and the alliance’s various air and missile defence 
activities—to say nothing of continuing military transformation in many capabili-
ties that could be applied to collective defence as well as to crisis response and 
stabilization operations. Certain steps to improve the alliance’s collective defence 
27 North Atlantic Council, Comprehensive Political Guidance, 26 Nov. 2006, para. 16a.
28 North Atlantic Council, Comprehensive Political Guidance, 26 Nov. 2006, para. 5.
29 For a recent discussion of nuclear deterrence issues related to the Strategic Concept review, see David S. 
Yost, ‘Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO’, International Affairs 85: 4, July 2009, pp. 755–80. 
See also Karl-Heinz Kamp and David S. Yost, eds, NATO and 21st century deterrence, Forum Paper 8 (Rome: 
NATO Defense College, May 2009), available at http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/fp_08.
pdf, accessed 6 Feb. 2010; and Paul Cornish, ‘NATO’s new Strategic Policy: going nuclear’, The World Today 
65: 12, Dec. 2009, pp. 23–4.
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capabilities—for example, enhanced situational awareness and command struc-
tures—could also support more effective action in non-Article 5 operations. Crisis 
response operations serve the security interests of the allies, albeit without the 
immediacy of preparations for collective defence of alliance territory in response 
to direct aggression. The alliance’s agreed force transformation goal is to sustain 
reliable capabilities across the full spectrum of missions.30
The challenge for the allies is to work out through experience the right balance 
between the core function of collective defence and their many non-Article 5 
tasks. Some allied observers have been concerned that the trajectory—sometimes 
with a boost from Washington—has been towards making NATO a reservoir of 
defence resources for potentially global applications, with an emphasis on expedi-
tionary capabilities designed for counterinsurgency and stabilization operations 
such as those in Afghanistan. How, some observers have asked, can the allies 
reconcile a global crisis management perspective with their regional collective 
defence commitments? It is clear, however, that NATO must remain an effec-
tive collective defence organization—that is, it must perform its core task—if it 
intends to serve as a platform for organizing crisis response operations beyond the 
territory of the allies.
Moreover, in the current financial and economic crisis, the allies must allocate 
their scarce military resources with even greater care. Since they do not wish to 
convert the alliance into a sort of ‘global policeman’—and cannot afford to do 
so anyway—the allies have to define priorities and take a selective approach to 
non-Article 5 tasks.
Collective defence has been reconfirmed as the top priority of several new 
allies on account of recent Russian behaviour. In particular, Moscow’s dispropor-
tionate use of force against Georgia in August 2008 has raised anxieties in some 
allied nations. The allies have agreed that further capability development and force 
transformation are imperative to underpin their ability to conduct ‘the full range’ 
of NATO ‘missions, including collective defence and crisis response operations 
on and beyond Alliance territory’.31 For example, at the April 2009 Strasbourg/
Kehl summit, the allies declared: ‘We will vigorously pursue our work developing 
and fielding key enablers, such as mission-capable helicopters, strategic lift and 
the Alliance Ground Surveillance system.’32 Allies such as Poland and the Baltic 
states have been (and remain) less concerned about the military capability of the 
alliance to deploy rapid reaction forces to their territory for collective defence 
than about the political will of some allies to honour their Article 5 commit-
ments in a serious crisis. Allies in east-central Europe would nonetheless welcome 
substantially greater Alliance attention to exercises, planning, and investment in 
support of territorial defence and deterrence.
30 According to the Comprehensive Political Guidance, ‘NATO must retain the ability to conduct the full range 
of its missions, from high to low intensity, placing special focus on the most likely operations, being respon-
sive to current and future operational requirements, and still able to conduct the most demanding operations’: 
North Atlantic Council, Comprehensive Political Guidance, 26 Nov. 2006, para. 7.
31 North Atlantic Council, Strasbourg/Kehl summit declaration, 4 April 2009, para. 42, available at http://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm, accessed 6 Feb. 2010.
32 North Atlantic Council, Strasbourg/Kehl summit declaration, 4 April 2009, para. 45.
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The continuing validity of the traditional meaning of collective defence
The alliance has clearly not abandoned the traditional meaning of collective 
defence. NATO’s new allies—above all, the Baltic states, the Czech Republic 
and Poland—have laid particular emphasis on maintaining the priority of collec-
tive defence in the sense of protecting national territory from external aggres-
sion. In December 2006, well before the Georgia–Russia conflict of August 2008, 
Vaira Vike-Freiberga, then president of Latvia, said: ‘If we were invaded … I 
would expect the NATO alliance to immediately react and to take all measures 
to defend us. This is absolutely the fundamental principle of the alliance and if 
ever the alliance falls down on it, the alliance collapses.’33 Expressions of anxiety 
about Russia have multiplied since August 2008, especially in Eastern and Central 
Europe.
Since the end of the Cold War the official alliance position has been that Russia 
is a partner. Indeed, constructive relations with Russia remain of paramount 
importance for all the allies. However, Moscow has become increasingly assertive 
since early 2007. The list of adverse actions attributed to Russia since that time 
includes its suspension of compliance with the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces 
in Europe Treaty, its mixed record regarding Iran’s nuclear activities, the 2007 
cyber-attacks on Estonia, its declarations that Poland and the Czech Republic have 
made themselves potential targets for nuclear attack by supporting US missile 
defence plans,34 its use of energy supplies as an instrument of coercion, and (of 
gravest concern) its use of force against Georgia in August 2008.
The allies stated in August 2008 that ‘Russian military action has been dispro-
portionate and inconsistent with its peacekeeping role, as well as incompatible 
with the principles of peaceful conflict resolution set out in the Helsinki Final Act, 
the NATO–Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration.’35 Moreover, the 
allies hold that Russia violated Georgia’s territorial integrity when it sent its forces 
beyond the enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and that Russia’s recogni-
tion of these enclaves as independent states is unwarranted and inconsistent with 
Russia’s previously avowed support for Georgia’s territorial integrity in UN 
Security Council resolutions. Russia’s recognition of these enclaves, allies have 
noted, contravenes the principles of the Organization for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (OSCE).36 It implies a willingness to modify international borders 
by force.
33 Vaira Vike-Freiberga, quoted in Stefan Wagstyl, ‘Vaira Vike-Freiberga, Latvia’s president’, Financial Times, 
Central and Eastern European Review, 15 Dec. 2006, p. 6.
34 See, among other examples, the statement by Colonel General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, the deputy chief of 
Russia’s General Staff, quoted in Damien McElroy, ‘Russian general says Poland a nuclear “target”’, Daily Tele-
graph, 15 August 2008, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/2564639/
Russian-general-says-Poland-a-nuclear-target-as-Condoleezza-Rice-arrives-in-Georgia.htm, accessed 7 Feb. 
2010. Russian statements regarding possible deployment of the dual capable Iskander missile in Kaliningrad 
have also been significant in this respect.
35 Statement of the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of foreign ministers held at NATO Head-
quarters, Brussels, on 19 Aug. 2008, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_29950.
htm, accessed 6 Feb. 2010.
36 North Atlantic Council, Strasbourg/Kehl summit declaration, 4 April 2009, para. 34.
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The NATO allies disagree strongly, however, about the extent to which their 
own decisions and actions may have contributed to Russia’s more confrontational 
approach. As Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, then the NATO Secretary General, observed 
in July 2009, ‘Russia’s recent assertiveness … has exposed a lack of Allied unity 
vis-à-vis Russia.’ Some allied observers, he noted, ‘question the future of NATO 
enlargement as a benign means of consolidating Europe’.37 Russian officials and 
experts have consistently expressed concerns about the alliance’s enlargement 
process since President Boris Yeltsin’s December 1994 speech warning that it 
could lead to a ‘cold peace’ in NATO–Russian relations.38 Some allied observers 
interpret Russian behaviour and statements as to some extent reactions to US or 
NATO policies, including the alliance’s enlargement process, the US withdrawal 
from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the US proposal to deploy missile 
defence system elements in Poland and the Czech Republic, and the decision by 
the NATO allies not to ratify the 1999 Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe unless Russia withdraws all its military forces from Georgia and 
Moldova. The Russians maintain that NATO’s policy of conditionality in respect 
of ratifying the Adapted CFE Treaty is an illegitimate interference in their bilat-
eral relations with Georgia and Moldova.39
Moscow’s military power was an explicit collective defence concern in the 1991 
Strategic Concept.40 In the 1999 Strategic Concept, however, the allies discreetly 
avoided any direct reference to Russia as a potential threat, and instead employed 
vague formulas—for example, the statement that ‘powerful nuclear forces outside 
the Alliance’ constitute ‘a significant factor which the Alliance has to take into 
account’.41
The allies will certainly reaffirm collective defence in the next Strategic 
37  Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, then NATO Secretary General, ‘NATO: securing our future’, speech at The Hague, 
6 July 2009, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-673A28DB-CADC4661/natolive/opinions_56150.
htm, accessed 6 Feb. 2010.
38 Boris Yeltsin’s speech at the CSCE summit in Budapest, Dec. 1994, quoted by Andrei Kozyrev, then the 
Russian foreign minister, in his article ‘Partnership or Cold Peace?’, Foreign Policy, no. 99, Summer 1995, p. 4.
39 The NATO allies have consistently noted Russia’s failure to honour its 1999 Istanbul commitments concerning 
its forces in Georgia and Moldova. As noted in a NATO report, ‘Both of these states have made clear that 
they will not ratify the Adapted CFE as long as Russian military forces remain on their territory without 
their consent, which is a violation of Article IV of the CFE Treaty and also would be a violation of Article 
IV of the Adapted CFE Treaty’: ‘NATO’s role in conventional arms control’, available at http://www.nato.
int/issues/arms_control/index.html, accessed 7 Feb. 2010. The long-standing position of the NATO allies, as 
noted in the Riga summit declaration, has been that ‘Fulfilment of the remaining Istanbul commitments on 
the Republic of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova will create the conditions for Allies and other States 
Parties to move forward on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty’: North Atlantic Council, Riga summit 
declaration, 29 Nov. 2006, para. 42. The Allies have maintained this position but have devised a ‘parallel 
actions package’ to address certain Russian concerns, bring Russia back into compliance with the CFE Treaty, 
and move forward with ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty.  See the North Atlantic Council statement 
on CFE, 28 March 2008, Press Release (2008) 047, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-047e.
html, accessed 14 Feb. 2010.
40 ‘Even in a non-adversarial and cooperative relationship, Soviet military capability and build-up potential, 
including its nuclear dimension, still constitute the most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take 
account in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe’: North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 7–8 Nov. 
1991, para. 13.
41 ‘The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance also constitutes a significant factor which the 
Alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained’: North 
Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, para. 21. Some allied observers have pointed out that the 
phrase ‘powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance’ could refer to China as well as Russia.
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Concept, and they will probably employ general language that could be inter-
preted as encompassing Russia as a potential Article 5 threat. However, the allies do 
not wish to antagonize Moscow, partly because they could benefit from coopera-
tion with Russia regarding terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation and Afghanistan, 
among other issues. Indeed, the allies have repeatedly agreed with Russia on 
extensive agendas of topics for cooperation, notably in the 1997 NATO–Russia 
Founding Act, in the 2002 ‘new quality’ statement, and at the meeting of the 
NATO–Russia Council (NRC) in December 2009—at which the NRC launched 
‘a Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges’ as proposed by 
the NATO Secretary General in September 2009.42
The alliance’s decisions about how to conduct exercises, planning and infra-
structure upgrading in support of collective defence and assurance to specific allies 
will be influenced by judgements about Russia’s policies and prospects. In April 
2009 President Obama stated: ‘We must work together as NATO members so 
that we have contingency plans in place to deal with new threats, wherever they 
may come from.’43 It was not until January 2010, however, that the NATO allies 
reportedly agreed in principle to prepare contingency plans for the defence of the 
Baltic states.44 It is noteworthy in this context that in December 2009 the allies 
marked their ‘formal resumption, at Ministerial level, of dialogue and cooperation 
with Russia’.45 The allies had pursued, it should be recalled, a ‘no business as usual’ 
policy in relations with Russia after the August 2008 Russia–Georgia war.46 The 
allies  in December 2009 nonetheless added:
NATO–Russia relations depend on trust and fulfilment of commitments. In contributing 
to building that trust we will continue to be transparent about our military training and 
exercises and look to Russia to reciprocate. We reaffirm the OSCE principles on which 
the security of Europe is based, and reiterate our continued support for the territorial 
42 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federa-
tion, Paris, 27 May 1997, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm, accessed 
21 Jan. 2010; ‘NATO–Russia relations: a new quality’, declaration by heads of state and government of 
NATO member states and the Russian Federation, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/offi-
cial_texts_19572.htm, accessed 21 Jan. 2010; press conference by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen after the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) meeting, 4 Dec. 2009, available at http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natolive/opinions_59971.htm, accessed 21 Jan. 2010; ‘NATO and Russia agree to move partnership 
forward’, NATO news release, 4 Dec. 2009, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_59970.
htm?, accessed 21 Jan. 2010.
43 Remarks by President Barack Obama, Prague, 5 April 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_
press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/, accessed 18 Jan. 2010.
44 ‘Border controls: thanks to Poland, the alliance will defend the Baltics’, Economist.com, 14 Jan. 2010, available 
at http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15268095, accessed 18 Jan. 2010.
45 Final statement, meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of foreign ministers held at NATO 
Headquarters, Brussels, 4 Dec. 2009, para. 12, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_59699.
htm?mode=pressrelease, accessed 19 Jan. 2010.
46 The foreign ministers of the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) met for the first time after the Russia–Georgia 
war of August 2008 in Corfu on 27 June 2009. The language employed in the Dec. 2009 statement by the 
North Atlantic Council suggests, however, that NATO foreign ministers did not regard the June 2009 meeting 
as constituting a ‘formal’ return to ministerial dialogue and cooperation in the NRC. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 
said in June 2009 that the NRC was ‘now back in gear’ and that Russia and the allies had ‘restarted … relations 
at a political level’ and had ‘agreed to restart the military-to-military contacts which … had been frozen since 
last August’. Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer after the NATO–Russia 
Council meeting in Corfu, Greece, 27 June 2009, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opin-
ions_55989.htm, accessed 6 Feb. 2010.
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integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders. We 
continue to call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
regions of Georgia as ‘independent states’. We encourage all participants in the Geneva 
talks to play a constructive role as well as to continue working closely with the OSCE, 
the United Nations and the European Union to pursue peaceful conflict resolution on 
Georgia’s territory.47
The allies also reaffirmed their ‘open door’ policy concerning NATO enlarge-
ment, including with respect to Georgia and Ukraine.48 Assistant Secretary of 
Defense Vershbow stated in October 2009:
Complaints from the Russian leadership about Ukraine and Georgia’s pursuit of NATO 
membership and Russian claims of privileged spheres of influence are troubling, and ones 
to which we are unequivocally opposed. Russia’s leaders must accept that an enlarged 
NATO is not a threat to Russia—on the contrary, by bringing Central and Eastern 
European countries into the alliance, NATO has helped consolidate democracy, security, 
and stability in the region—a process that has left Russia more, not less, secure.49
The changing meaning of collective defence
How—and to what extent—have the allies given new meaning to their collective 
defence commitments?
Although, as discussed above, the traditional meaning of collective defence—
action by the allies to counter ‘an armed attack’ against any ally—remains valid,50 
the distinction between Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations has become less 
clear-cut and more elusive, at least in some circumstances.
During the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, NATO found it advisable on some 
occasions to extend security assurances to states neighbouring the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia—in effect, to promise protection against possible retali-
ation by Belgrade for cooperation with the alliance. The alliance expressed such 
security assurances most explicitly during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, when the 
neighbouring states—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania and Slovenia—helped the 
allies by aiding refugees, hosting NATO forces, granting access to airspace for 
operations, and/or imposing economic sanctions.51 In April 1999 NATO heads of 
state and government met with representatives of these seven states and ‘reaffirmed 
47 Final statement, meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of foreign ministers held at NATO Head-
quarters, Brussels, 4 Dec. 2009, para. 13.
48 Final statement, meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of foreign ministers held at NATO Head-
quarters, Brussels, 4 Dec. 2009, para. 10.
49 Vershbow, ‘Crafting the new Strategic Concept’.
50 According to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, ‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or 
more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently 
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collec-
tive self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties 
so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems 
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area’.
51 See the comments by Jamie Shea, then the NATO spokesman, at press conference with Colonel Konrad 
Freytag, SHAPE, in Washington, 25 April 1999, available at http://www.nato.int/Kosovo/press/p990425b.
htm, accessed 6 Feb. 2010.
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that the security of the neighbouring states was of direct and material concern 
to Alliance member states and that NATO would respond to any challenges by 
Belgrade to the neighbouring states resulting from the presence of NATO forces 
and their activities on their territory during this crisis’.52 In other words, in order 
to conduct non-Article 5 operations, the NATO allies chose to extend security 
commitments to third parties that were comparable in some ways to the Article 5 
mutual defence pledges that they had made to each other. These security commit-
ments were, however, circumscribed with precise conditions distinguishing them 
from the Article 5 pledges.
NATO’s role in leading ISAF in Afghanistan has been mandated by UN Security 
Council resolutions, and the allies generally regard it as a non-Article 5 operation. 
It should nonetheless be recalled that the UN Security Council first established 
ISAF in December 2001 in circumstances deriving from what the NATO allies 
regarded as an Article 5 contingency. The United States and its coalition partners 
in Operation Enduring Freedom, including several NATO allies, intervened in 
Afghanistan in response to Al-Qaeda’s attacks in New York and Washington on 
11 September 2001. These attacks led the NATO allies to invoke Article 5 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty, and the NATO allies took several steps to facilitate the 
conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom and to help ensure the defeat of the 
Taleban regime in Afghanistan, which had served as a base of operations for the 
Al-Qaeda terrorist network.53
The UN Security Council authorized the establishment of ISAF because the 
United States and its coalition partners (many of them NATO allies) had forcibly 
ousted the Taleban regime. ISAF’s initial mission was ‘to assist the Afghan 
Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding 
areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the 
United Nations can operate in a secure environment’.54 From the outset, NATO 
member states contributed most of the forces in ISAF. Moreover, ISAF was led 
by a series of NATO allies—the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Germany and the 
 Netherlands—from December 2001 to August 2003, when it became a NATO-led 
operation.
NATO’s subsequent contributions to the implementation of the 2006 Afghani-
stan Compact and other measures intended to promote the establishment of a 
stable and democratic government in the country may be regarded as moves to 
prevent the return of the Taleban to power and to block the reconstitution of 
Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and operational headquarters there. In other 
words, these measures may be considered as actions intended to prevent the 
re-emergence of an Article 5 threat. To quote a UN Security Council resolu-
tion of December 2001, the goal is ‘to help the people of Afghanistan to bring 
52 Chairman’s summary of the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of heads of state and govern-
ment with countries in the region of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 25 April 1999, para. 5, available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27439.htm, accessed 6 Feb. 2010.
53 Until September 2001 the reference in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to the contingency of ‘an armed 
attack’ was generally assumed to concern state aggression, not terrorist attacks.
54 UN Security Council Resolution 1386, adopted 20 Dec. 2001.
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to an end the tragic conflicts in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, 
lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights, as well as to cooperate with 
the international  community to put an end to the use of Afghanistan as a base for 
terrorism’.55 Thus there may be an element of collective defence in a nominally 
non-Article 5 operation. The security of the allies may depend on events far 
from their national territories; and the allies clearly have incentives to deal with 
emerging threats at their source, whenever possible.
Other factors also tend to obscure the difference between Article 5 and 
non-Article 5 operations. While the alliance’s Balkan and Afghanistan opera-
tions are all officially regarded as non-Article 5 operations, the NATO allies have 
suffered greater casualties in combat in Afghanistan since 2001 than they have 
incurred in their operations in the Balkans since 1992; and they have reason to 
expect continuing combat in operations against the Taleban and Al-Qaeda and 
other terrorist organizations. Moreover, the NATO allies face a genuine threat 
of terrorist attacks against their homelands, and these attacks may be portrayed 
by their perpetrators and sympathizers as retaliation for NATO’s intervention in 
Afghanistan—to say nothing of other grievances that might be cited by terror-
ists. In short, NATO’s ostensibly non-Article 5 engagement in Afghanistan differs 
from its Balkan operations both because it originated in what the allies regarded as 
an Article 5 contingency—an act of aggression against a NATO ally—and because 
it involves greater combat and homeland security risks.
The NATO allies have chosen in recent years to open their principal ongoing 
Article 5 mission, Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, to contri-
butions by non-allies. At the June 2004 Istanbul summit, the allies decided to 
welcome ‘the contributory support of partner countries, including the Mediter-
ranean Dialogue countries’.56 To date two Mediterranean Dialogue countries, 
Israel and Morocco, have signed Exchanges of Letters with NATO regarding 
participation in Operation Active Endeavour. Russia participated in the opera-
tion in 2006 and 2007, and Ukraine did so in 2007 and 2008. Georgia and NATO 
completed an Exchange of Letters about participation in the operation in 2008.57 
It is noteworthy that the allies, having initiated Operation Active Endeavour as a 
collective defence mission under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and Article 
51 of the UN Charter, have subsequently reached beyond the alliance to ‘work 
very closely with the relevant law enforcement and intelligence agencies of … 
partner nations’.58 Moreover, the alliance has placed Operation Active Endeavour 
within the context of ‘NATO’s determination to consult and cooperate closely 
with the United Nations in the fight against terrorism’, including ‘full implemen-
55 UN Security Council Resolution 1383, adopted 6 Dec. 2001.
56 North Atlantic Council, Istanbul summit communiqué, 28 June 2004, para. 10, available at http://www.nato.
int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm, accessed 6 Feb. 2010.
57 ‘Operation Active Endeavour’, NATO website, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.
htm, accessed 22 July 2009; ‘Operation Active Endeavour’, Allied Maritime Component Command, Naples, 
available at http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Operations/ActiveEndeavour/Endeavour.htm, accessed 22 
July 2009.
58 Letter from NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to UN Secretary General Kofi A. Annan, SG 
(2006) 0013, 10 Jan. 2006.
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tation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 and support to the 
UN Global Strategy in the fight against terrorism’.59
Article 5 obligations have historically been bounded by Article 6 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, which defines the geographical area in which an ‘armed attack’ 
would oblige the allies to honour their Article 5 commitments as consisting essen-
tially of the territory of the allies in Europe and North America.60 Some experts 
have nonetheless argued that since the terrorist attacks against the United States in 
September 2001 the allies have adopted policies that could lead to a certain ‘deter-
ritorialization’ of collective defence under Article 5. In their view, this ‘deterrito-
rialization’ tendency may be discerned in key definitions of the alliance’s security 
requirements articulated since September 2001.61 In May 2002, the North Atlantic 
Council declared:
To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can 
move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, 
and achieve their objectives. This will require the development of new and balanced 
capabilities within the alliance, including strategic lift and modern strike capabilities, so 
that NATO can more effectively respond collectively to any threat of aggression against a 
member state.62
The geographical limitations on the contingencies that could lead the allies 
to take action regarding their collective defence obligations laid out in Article 6 
still apply juridically; and the allies have not assumed legal obligations to adopt 
a new approach to collective defence beyond Articles 5 and 6. However, some 
experts maintain that the phrase ‘wherever they are needed’, in conjunction with 
the decision to prepare to ‘more effectively respond collectively to any threat of 
aggression against a member state’, represented a politically significant departure 
from the comparatively passive attitude to collective defence expressed by the 
allies in the decades before September 2001. It implied a shift away from a static, 
reactive and territorial concept of collective defence in which the allies would act 
to protect their security interests only in response to ‘an armed attack’ in Europe 
or North America. Henceforth, rather than waiting for ‘an armed attack’, the 
allies—to repeat the terms of their communiqué—expressed a determination 
59 Letter from NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, SG 
(2007) 0260, 18 April 2007.
60 Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty reads as follows: ‘For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one 
or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe 
or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Islands under the 
jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; on the forces, 
vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which 
occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the 
Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.’ The geographical area of appli-
cation of Article 6 is clarified by two notes. The first note makes clear that Turkish territory outside Europe 
is covered by Article 5: ‘The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of 
the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951.’ 
The second note excludes France’s former possessions in Algeria: ‘On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic 
Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses 
of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.’
61 The author thanks Diego Ruiz Palmer for having first raised this point with reference to Article 5 and for 
having suggested the term ‘deterritorialization’.
62 North Atlantic Council, final communiqué of 14 May 2002, para. 5.
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to ‘respond collectively to any threat of aggression against a member state’. The 
concept of moving forces ‘quickly to wherever they are needed’ also suggested an 
interest in taking action against emerging threats at their point of origin. This shift 
was confirmed at the Prague summit in November 2002, when the NATO allies 
‘approved a comprehensive package of measures … to strengthen our ability to 
meet the challenges to the security of our forces, populations and territory, from 
wherever they may come’.63
The alliance’s move towards a more proactive and anticipatory concept of 
Article 5 requirements became even more explicit when it published a summary 
of its Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism in October 2003:
The Political Guidance provided by the [North Atlantic] Council … stipulated that 
NATO’s actions should: … Help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist attacks 
or threat of attacks, directed from abroad against populations, territory, infrastructure and 
forces of any NATO member state, including by acting against these terrorists and those 
who harbour them … [and] Work on the assumption that it is preferable to deter terrorist 
attacks or to prevent their occurrence rather than deal with their consequences and be 
prepared to deploy as and where required to deal with particular circumstances as they 
arise … Therefore the following planning aspects need special attention: Procedures and 
capabilities that support accelerated decision cycles, in order to be successful in detecting 
and attacking time sensitive targets in the Counter Terrorist environment … Once it is 
known where the terrorists are or what they are about to do, military forces need the 
capability to deploy there. Due to the likelihood that warnings will be received only at very 
short notice, forces need to be at a high state of readiness … In addition to the capabilities 
described above, the Concept identifies certain procedures that need to be developed or 
enhanced. These include: … Making Alliance decision making as effective and timely as 
possible in order that, given the very short warnings that are likely for terrorist activity 
and intentions, Alliance forces can be deployed and employed appropriately.64
One of the key points about this Military Concept is that it may be impos-
sible to ‘disrupt’ the ‘threat of attacks’ or ‘prevent their occurrence’ or take action 
‘once it is known where the terrorists are or what they are about to do’ without 
engaging in anticipatory action. It therefore appears that the allies are in fact 
willing (at least as a matter of abstract principle) to make effective use of what they 
have referred to as ‘the very short warnings that are likely for terrorist activity 
and intentions’.65 At the same time, some allies have invested in measures designed 
to deter terrorist attacks, particularly enhanced protection for specific sites and 
resilience and consequence-mitigation capabilities. Such capabilities may promote 
‘deterrence by denial’ by communicating the message that ‘hard targets’ involve a 
high risk of operational failure for terrorists.66
63 North Atlantic Council, Prague summit declaration, 21 Nov. 2002, para. 3.
64 NATO’s Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism, Oct. 2003, available at www.nato.int/ims/docu/
terrorism.htm, accessed 2 July 2009. This document is an authoritative description of the concept endorsed 
at the NATO summit in Prague on 21 Nov. 2002.
65 For background, see David S. Yost, ‘NATO and the anticipatory use of force’, International Affairs 83: 1, Jan. 
2007, pp. 39–68.
66 David S. Yost, ‘New approaches to deterrence in Britain, France, and the United States’, International Affairs 
81: 1, Jan. 2005, pp. 86, 91, 100–102, 109.
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In short, the political meaning given to collective defence by the allies appears 
to be in transition. It seems to be no longer limited to the reactive defence of the 
national territories of the allies. Mainly in response to the new threats apparent 
since 11 September 2001, the allies have taken a more proactive approach and have 
articulated a willingness to act against emerging and imminent threats. While the 
treaty obligations for collective defence remain as defined by Articles 5 and 6, the 
allies have suggested a broader scope for collective defence in some of their state-
ments and actions.
Moreover, some prominent observers have recently pointed to a more exten-
sive conception of collective defence than that articulated in Articles 5 and 6 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty. In July 2009, in one of his last statements as NATO 
Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said: ‘Article 5 … can apply outside 
NATO territory as much as inside. Today the challenge is not to defend our terri-
tory but our populations; and they, unlike our territory, move around.’67 On the 
same occasion, a seminar launching NATO’s Strategic Concept review, Madeleine 
Albright, a former US Secretary of State, said that collective defence and Article 
5 ‘remain, properly, the cornerstone of our alliance. However, we must also be 
prepared to respond to threats that arise beyond our territory, taking into account 
the urgency of those threats, the availability of other security options, and the 
likely consequences of acting or of failing to act.’68
The distinction between Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations thus appears 
less clear-cut than it was during the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s. Nominally 
Article 5 operations, such as Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, 
have been supported by non-allies, including states in the alliance’s Partnership 
for Peace and Mediterranean Dialogue; and this operation has been placed in 
the context of UN Security Council resolutions and UN-led counterterrorism 
efforts. Similarly, nominally non-Article 5 operations, notably in Afghanistan, 
can be seen as serving a purpose consistent with Article 5—that is, preventing the 
emergence of a new Article 5 threat. Afghanistan in particular marks the alliance’s 
shift from a geographical view of security to a functional approach.
Illustrations of the changing dimensions of collective defence
At least six other issues illustrate the changing dimensions of collective defence: 
missile defence, cyber-warfare, space operations, state-sponsored WMD terrorism, 
political–military dynamics in the Middle East and the Asia–Pacific region, and 
the risk of a non-Article 5 operation becoming a collective defence contingency.
67 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, ‘Launching NATO’s New Strategic Concept’, introductory 
remarks at the opening of the Strategic Concept seminar, Brussels, 7 July 2009, available at http://www.nato.
int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_56153.htm, accessed 6 Feb. 2010.
68  Madeleine Albright, ‘NATO 2009: past lessons, future prospects’, speech at the Strategic Concept seminar, 
Brussels, 7 July 2009, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_56158.htm, accessed 14 Feb. 
2010. Albright is the chair of the group of twelve experts appointed by the NATO Secretary General to 
serve as advisers on the new Strategic Concept. For background on the Strategic Concept review process, see 
‘Group of experts’ at http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/experts-strategic-concept.html, and ‘A three-
phased approach’ at http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/roadmap-strategic-concept.html#approach, 
accessed 21 Jan. 2010.
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Missile defence
The 1999 Strategic Concept contained a single reference to missile defence: ‘The 
Alliance’s defence posture against the risks and potential threats of the proliferation 
of NBC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] weapons and their means of delivery 
must continue to be improved, including through work on missile defences.’69
Until 2002 work on missile defence under alliance auspices concentrated on 
‘theater missile defence’ (TMD)—that is, systems configured to protect forces 
deployed on operations from shorter-range ballistic and cruise missiles, not systems 
designed to shield territory and population centres. The focus on TMD reflected 
operational requirements as well as the political and legal obstacles to pursuing 
defences against ‘strategic ballistic missiles’ in the 1972 US–Soviet Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty. This treaty prohibited the construction of such defences 
by the United States beyond the single site in North Dakota permitted after the 
treaty’s amendment in 1974, so there was no question of building such defences in 
NATO Europe. Moreover, the treaty prohibited transfers of technology for such 
defences to third parties, including the NATO allies.
The US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty took effect in June 2002, ending 
the treaty obstacles to the construction of missile defences for the protection of 
NATO European cities and territories. In November 2002, at the Prague summit, 
the allies agreed to
examine options for addressing the increasing missile threat to alliance territory, forces and 
population centres in an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of polit-
ical and defence efforts, along with deterrence. Today we initiated a new NATO Missile 
Defence feasibility study to examine options for protecting alliance territory, forces and 
population centres against the full range of missile threats, which we will continue to assess. 
Our efforts in this regard will be consistent with the indivisibility of Allied security.70
The reference to ‘deterrence’ in the decision to launch the feasibility study 
was significant because it reflected the conviction of some allies that the threat of 
retaliation was a sufficient means of protection against missile attack. Four years 
later, in November 2006, the allies announced the completion of the feasibility 
study: ‘It concludes that missile defence is technically feasible within the limita-
tions and assumptions of the study. We tasked continued work on the political 
and military implications of missile defence for the Alliance including an update 
on missile threat developments.’71
The alliance has not yet made a decision to pursue a NATO missile defence 
system to protect territory and populations. In December 2009 the allies endorsed 
the Obama administration’s decision in September that year to refine the plans for 
missile defence system element deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic 
that it had inherited from the George W. Bush administration: ‘We welcome the 
new phased adaptive approach of the United States to missile defence, which 
69 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, para. 56.
70 North Atlantic Council, Prague summit declaration, 21 Nov. 2002, para. 4g.
71 North Atlantic Council, Riga summit declaration, 29 Nov. 2006, para. 25.
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further reinforces NATO’s central role in missile defence in Europe. This approach 
would further anchor European missile defence work in NATO, which continues 
to bear in mind the principle of the indivisibility of alliance security as well as 
NATO solidarity.’72
The allies have also approved studies concerning possible expanded work 
on the alliance’s TMD programme ‘beyond the protection of NATO deployed 
forces to include territorial missile defence’.73 The allies have not yet, however, 
made a decision to pursue a missile defence system designed to protect cities and 
territories. In December 2009 they stated: ‘If the Alliance decides to develop a 
NATO missile defence capability in Europe to protect populations and territory, 
the United States’ phased adaptive approach would provide a valuable national 
contribution to that capability and, thus, to Alliance security.’74
What may force decisions on the question is the fact, acknowledged in the 
same communiqué, that ‘the proliferation of ballistic missiles poses an increasing 
threat to allies’ populations, territory and forces’.75 The continuing diffusion and 
improvement of ballistic and cruise missiles in Eurasia, the Middle East and the 
Asia–Pacific region are likely to lead to further US and NATO investments, even 
if the allies choose not to say much about missile defence in the next Strategic 
Concept.
Cyber-warfare
The vulnerability of modern communications and information systems raises the 
threat that an adversary could achieve strategic effects without undertaking overt 
military aggression. In October 2008, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
stated:
As we know from recent experience, attacks on our communications systems and infra-
structure will be a part of future war. Our policy goal is obviously to prevent anyone from 
being able to take down our systems. Deterrence here might entail figuring out how to 
make our systems redundant, as with the old Nuclear Triad. Imagine easily deployable, 
replacement satellites that could be launched from high-altitude planes—or high-altitude 
UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] that could operate as mobile data links. The point is to 
make the effort to attack us seem pointless in the first place. Similarly, future administra-
tions will have to consider new declaratory policies about what level of cyber-attack might 
be considered an act of war—and what type of military response is appropriate.76
72 Final statement, meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of foreign ministers held at NATO Head-
quarters, Brussels, 4 Dec. 2009, para. 14.
73 Final statement, meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of foreign ministers held at NATO Head-
quarters, Brussels, 4 Dec. 2009, para. 15.
74 Final statement, meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of foreign ministers held at NATO Head-
quarters, Brussels, 4 Dec. 2009, para. 16.
75 Final statement, meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of foreign ministers held at NATO Head-
quarters, Brussels, 4 Dec. 2009, para. 14.
76 Speech delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Washington DC,  28 Oct. 2008, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1305, 
accessed 2 July 2009.
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If the United States has yet to decide what to say in its declaratory policy about 
‘what level of cyber-attack might be considered an act of war’, this may also be 
an issue for the allies to consider in their next Strategic Concept. After all, one 
of the Strategic Concept’s purposes is to support the alliance’s deterrence posture. 
The allies noted in the 1999 Strategic Concept that ‘state and non-state adversaries 
may try to exploit the Alliance’s growing reliance on information systems through 
information operations designed to disrupt such systems’.77 The allies expressed 
an intention to ‘strengthen … capabilities to defend against cyber attacks’ in the 
2002 Prague Summit Declaration, and articulated more detailed policies in this 
regard at the summits in Bucharest in 2008 and Strasbourg/Kehl in 2009.78 The 
Alliance has, moreover, established institutions to deal with the cyber-warfare 
challenge.79 The challenge is grave because, as the US Department of Defense 
noted in February 2010, ‘In the 21st century, modern armed forces simply cannot 
conduct high-tempo, effective operations without resilient, reliable information 
and communication networks and assured access to cyberspace … Moreover, the 
speed of cyber attacks and the anonymity of cyberspace greatly favor the offense. 
This advantage is growing as hacker tools become cheaper and easier to employ 
by adversaries whose skills are growing in sophistication’.80
Greg Rattray, Chris Evans and Jason Healey, all with Delta Risk Consulting, 
have argued that responsibility for cyber-attacks can in some cases be reliably 
assigned to states: ‘Determining responsibility re-establishes some state-to-state 
symmetry and enables deterrence, as well as a wider range of options open to 
sovereign nations: diplomatic, intelligence, military and/or economic respons-
es’.81 Sverre Myrli, a member of the Norwegian parliament, has summarized the 
problems for the Alliance as follows:
Estonian defence minister Jaak Aaviksoo has said that cyber war today represents an equiv-
alent threat to the blockading of countries’ ports two hundred years ago – a nation’s access 
to the world could be denied. The analogy raises questions about whether cyber attacks 
should now be categorized amongst conventionally regarded acts of war … The decision 
to announce an expansion of Article 5 to encompass cyber attacks may cause potential 
77 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, para. 23.
78 North Atlantic Council, Prague summit declaration, 21 Nov. 2002, para. 4f; North Atlantic Council, Bucha-
rest summit declaration, 3 April 2008, para.  47, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.
html, accessed 7 Feb. 2010; and North Atlantic Council, Strasbourg/Kehl summit declaration, 4 April 2009, 
para. 49.
79 These institutions include the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) approved at the 
Prague summit in 2002 and two organizations established in 2008: the NATO Cyber Defence Management 
Authority (NCDMA) and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), the 
latter based in Tallinn, Estonia.
80 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, 
Feb. 2010), p. 37.
81 Greg Rattray, Chris Evans and Jason Healey, ‘American security in the cyber commons’, in Abraham M. 
Denmark and James Mulvenon, eds, Contested commons: the future of American power in a multipolar world (Wash-
ington DC: Center for a New American Security, Jan. 2010), p. 171, available at http://www.cnas.org/
node/4012, accessed 7 Feb. 2010. In their view, in the case of the attacks against Estonia in 2007, ‘All signs 
pointed to Russian involvement: Many of the cyber attacks themselves were traced to Russia; many of the 
attack tools were written in Russian; many of the corrupted Estonian websites were polluted with strong 
nationalist Russian reactions; numerous Russian politicians openly supported the attacks; and the Russian 
government refused to stop or even investigate the attacks’. Rattray et al.,‘American security’, p. 170.
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aggressors to think twice, but would it excessively restrict NATO’s options in a crisis 
management scenario? How can the danger of misidentifying an aggressor be avoided? If 
the source of a cyber attack can be identified with certainty, which forms of cyber attack 
can NATO consider as direct acts of aggression against a Member or Members, and which 
constitute indirect acts of aggression?82
Admiral James Stavridis, USN, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR), recently said, ‘In NATO … we need to talk about what defines an 
attack … I believe it is more likely that an attack will come not off a bomb rack 
on an aircraft, but as electrons moving down a fiber optic cable’.83 As with certain 
other challenges, the NATO allies may choose formulations in the next Strategic 
Concept that will allow them latitude to deal with cyber contingencies when they 
arise, despite the argument that more precise declaratory policies might contribute 
to deterrence.
Space operations
Defense Secretary Gates’s reference to developing redundant communications 
systems—including the option of launching ‘easily deployable, replacement satel-
lites’—as a hedge against cyber-attacks underscores the close linkages between 
cyber-warfare and space operations. As Michèle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley 
have noted, cyberspace and outer space, together with the sea and the atmosphere, 
constitute ‘the global commons, those areas of the world beyond the control of 
any one state’. From a US national security perspective, they added, ‘stability 
and security in space and cyberspace will depend on working with our allies and 
partners to develop a common framework and advance international norms that 
can shape the choices and behavior of others’.84
The armed forces of the NATO allies depend heavily on national space capabil-
ities in expeditionary and other operations for command, control, communica-
tions and intelligence (C3I), as well as for navigation and guidance. Owing to 
the alliance’s increasing reliance on space, Thomas Single has argued, ‘it is time 
to break the paradigm that Space capabilities are veiled in secrecy, are strategic 
in nature only or are too politically sensitive to discuss in an Alliance forum’.85 
If the NATO allies do not determine their requirements collectively, in Single’s 
view, they ‘will continue to duplicate efforts, field systems that are not interoper-
able, and retain stove-piped intelligence networks … There is an urgent need for 
NATO to state the intended Alliance use of Space capabilities.’86 Whether the 
82 Sverre Myrli, NATO and cyber defence, 173 DSCFC 09 E bis (Brussels: NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2009), 
paras 59 and 61, available at http://www.nato-pa.int/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=1782, accessed 7 Feb. 2010.
83 Stavridis quoted in Antonie Boessenkool, ‘NATO Chief:  Nations Must Unite on Cyber Warfare’, Defense 
News, 2 Feb. 2010, available at http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4483043, accessed 14 Feb. 2010.
84 Michèle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, ‘The contested commons’, US Naval Institute, Proceedings 135: 7, July 
2009, available at http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY_ID=1950, accessed 18 Oct. 
2009. Michèle Flournoy is the US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Shawn Brimley is a strategist 
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
85 Thomas Single, NATO space operations assessment (Kalkar, Germany: Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Jan. 
2009), p. 51, available at http://www.japcc.de/108.html, accessed 6 Feb. 2010.
86 Single, NATO space operations assessment, pp. 7, 9.
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NATO allies will follow this prescription in the next Strategic Concept is unclear, 
partly because of differences among the allies in their space policies and interpreta-
tions of international law affecting space. They might agree to include a general 
formula in the Strategic Concept declaring that the NATO allies require ‘assured 
access to space’ without saying anything about the means, diplomatic and/or 
military, to achieve that goal. As with cyber-attacks, the level of damage to space 
capabilities through an enemy’s attack that might be regarded by the allies as ‘an 
act of war’—or, in NATO terms, an Article 5 collective defence contingency—is 
not self-evident, particularly if the attack caused no direct fatalities.
Moreover, Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates that Article 5 would 
apply in the event of ‘an armed attack … on the forces, vessels or aircraft of any 
of the Parties, when in or over these territories’. Of course, no NATO ally had 
any ‘forces, vessels or aircraft’ in space in 1949; and in the late 1950s the first satel-
lites established the international legal principle that national sovereignty does not 
extend beyond a country’s airspace into space. This suggests that an ally’s military 
assets in space are implicitly excluded from the geographical coverage specified in 
Article 6.
Another obstacle to achieving allied consensus on devoting more attention to 
space security issues in NATO is that no ally’s space assets have yet come under 
‘armed attack.’ Nor is it clear how such an attack should be defined in the case of 
space assets. Would jamming Global Positioning System (GPS) signals constitute 
such an attack? Would ‘blinding’ a satellite with a laser amount to such an attack? 
The same lack of agreed definitions applies to cyber attacks. To what extent, for 
example, could hacking a website, destroying data, denying service, or inserting a 
virus constitute ‘an armed attack’? In contrast with space, however, a NATO ally 
has experienced cyber attacks—Estonia in 2007. 
Various actions have nonetheless affected satellite functions without being 
widely characterized as attacks.  For example, in 2003 Iraq reportedly used Russian-
supplied GPS jammers against the United States; in 2006 US officials revealed that 
China had directed a laser at a US satellite and ‘painted’ it; and since 2003 Iran has 
repeatedly jammed satellite communications signals from foreign broadcasters and 
network services. Moreover, hackers have targeted the functions of some satellites 
via cyberspace.  According to Eric Sterner of the George C. Marshall Institute, 
‘if threats are interpreted as a function of both intent and capability, multiple 
state and non-state actors have demonstrated ample intentions and capabilities to 
attack space systems’. Because of Estonia’s experience in 2007, it may be easier to 
gain consensus in NATO about the significance of cyber attacks than about that 
of assaults on space capabilities. In other words, it is harder to gain consensus 
when the gravity of a threat has not yet been dramatically demonstrated. NATO 
agreement on an enhanced cyber policy might, however, be a step towards greater 
consensus on space policy.87
87 Eric Sterner, ‘Beyond the stalemate in the space commons’, in Abraham M. Denmark and James Mulvenon, 
eds, Contested commons: the future of American power in a multipolar world (Washington DC:  Center for a New 
American Security, January 2010), pp. 117–18, available at http://www.cnas.org/node/4012, accessed 7 Feb. 
2010.
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State-sponsored WMD terrorism
Britain, France and the United States have in recent years highlighted the threat 
of state-sponsored terrorist attacks employing nuclear weapons, and they have 
made clear their determination to identify any anonymous attacker and retaliate. 
In the words of Defense Secretary Gates, ‘To add teeth to the deterrent goal of this 
policy, we are pursuing new technologies to identify the forensic signatures of any 
nuclear material used in an attack—to trace it back to the source.’ Moreover, as 
Gates noted, ‘the United States has made it clear for many years that it reserves the 
right to respond with overwhelming force to the use of weapons of mass destruc-
tion against the United States, our people, our forces, and our friends and allies’.88
Since the alliance’s three nuclear weapon states have chosen to make this issue 
part of their declaratory policies with a view to deterrence, this could also be 
seen as a question for NATO’s next Strategic Concept.89 Once again, supporting 
NATO’s deterrence posture is an essential function of the Strategic Concept. 
Will the allies judge it prudent to include a statement holding state sponsors of 
terrorism accountable for nominally anonymous attacks with WMD? Or will 
they decide that the mutual defence pledge in Article 5 is sufficient and that there 
is no need to refer explicitly to this potential contingency?90
Political–military dynamics in the Middle East and the Asia–Pacific region
The words ‘Asia’, ‘Pacific’, ‘China’, ‘Japan’, ‘Korea’, ‘India’, ‘Pakistan’, ‘Iran’, and 
‘Middle East’ did not appear in the 1999 Strategic Concept. Its authors maintained 
a resolute focus on the ‘Euro-Atlantic’ region. The closest they came to recog-
nizing an  international context beyond the Euro-Atlantic area was the vague 
observation that
88 Speech delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Washington DC, 28 Oct. 2008. See also the speech by Jacques Chirac, then president of France, at Landivisiau-
l’Ile Longue, 19 Jan. 2006, available at http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais_archives/interventions/
discours_et_declarations/2006/janvier/allocution_du_president_de_la_republique_lors_de_sa_visite_aux_
forces_aeriennes_et_oceanique_strategiques-landivisiau-l_ile_longue-finistere.38406.html, accessed 2 July 
2009; and the UK defence white paper, The future of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent, Cm 6994 (London: 
HMSO, Dec. 2006), p. 19, para. 3–11, available at http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79–76D6–
4FE3–91A1–6A56B03C092F/0/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf, accessed 2 July 2009. While the US 
and French statements referred to states employing terrorist groups to deliver ‘weapons of mass destruction’, 
the British white paper focused on the narrower category of state  sponsors ‘transferring nuclear weapons or 
nuclear technology to terrorists’.
89 The allies noted in the 1999 Strategic Concept that ‘Non-state actors have shown the potential to create and use 
some of these weapons’—that is, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons—but did not discuss the possible 
risk of state-sponsored WMD terrorism: North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, para. 22.
90 Some European allied observers have indicated in interviews that referring to such a contingency in the Stra-
tegic Concept might be counterproductive because it might alarm the public in NATO nations. In their view, 
the document should provide reassurance to the public while nonetheless communicating a deterrent message 
to potential adversaries. Conversely, it might be argued that the allies have already come close to referring 
to such a contingency in the Comprehensive Political Guidance: ‘As shown by the terrorist attacks on the 
United States in 2001 following which NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time, future attacks may originate 
from outside the Euro-Atlantic area and involve unconventional forms of armed assault. Future attacks could 
also entail an increased risk of the use of asymmetric means, and could involve the use of weapons of mass 
destruction’: North Atlantic Council, Comprehensive Political Guidance, 26 Nov. 2006, para. 5.
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The security of the alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military 
risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncer-
tainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional 
crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly … The resulting 
tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to 
armed conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over 
into neighbouring countries, including NATO countries, or in other ways, and could also 
affect the security of other states.91
The alliance’s strictly Euro-Atlantic focus reflects its origins. When they 
concluded the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the allies wished to focus on security in 
Europe and North America and to avoid assuming additional security  obligations, 
notably with respect to the overseas colonies of some allies. The geographical 
limits in Article 6 of the treaty therefore concern the area of  application of the 
mutual defence pledge in Article 5. NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan is only 
one indicator of how the long-standing Eurocentric concentration has been 
qualified and may be subject to further adjustment. As noted previously, at the 
Prague summit in November 2002, the NATO allies expressed a determination ‘to 
strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the security of our forces, popula-
tions and territory, from wherever they may come’.92 The allies condemned the 
nuclear weapon tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998,93 as well as the 
ballistic missile and nuclear weapon tests by North Korea in 2006 and 2009.94
The 2008 French defence white paper compared economic, demographic 
and technological modernization trends in Asia with those in the Euro-Atlantic 
region, and drew attention to ‘a gradual shift of the strategic centre of gravity 
toward Asia’.
Asia is already the most dynamic part of the world … It is also a region with numerous 
unresolved conflicts (Kashmir, the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan question) and interstate 
tensions (India–Pakistan, India–China, China–Japan), and where three of the principal 
countries of the world have strategic interests and a military presence (Russia, China, 
and the United States). It is the only region where three nuclear powers have common 
borders that are not internationally recognized (India–Pakistan–China), while North 
Korea, which conducted a nuclear test in October 2006 and which continues to develop 
its ballistic technologies, alarms its neighbours, particularly Japan … In this context, the 
strong increase in military effort, notably in China (with announced budget rates of an 
average of 10% a year from 1989 to 2007, and of 17% for the years 2007 and 2008), is a factor 
91 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, para. 20.
92 North Atlantic Council, Prague summit declaration, 21 Nov. 2002, para. 3.
93 NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council meeting at ministerial level, Luxembourg, 28 May 1998, Statement 
on the Nuclear Tests of Pakistan and India, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p980529e.htm, 
accessed 14 Feb. 2010. See also NATO–Ukraine Commission meeting at ministerial level, Luxembourg, 
29 May 1998, NATO press release (98) 62, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98–062e.htm, 
accessed 14 Feb. 2010.
94 NATO press release (2006) 081, 5 July 2006, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06–081e.htm, 
accessed 21 Jan. 2010; NATO press release (2006) 119, 10 Oct. 2006, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/
pr/2006/p06–119e.htm, accessed 21 Jan. 2010; NATO press release (2009) 077, 25 May 2009, available at http://
www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A1BC720E-77E98810/natolive/news_55112.htm?mode=pressrelease, accessed 21 
Jan. 2010.
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of preoccupation that is all the more serious because data concerning this effort lack trans-
parency in the case of China, the region has no collective security system, and confidence 
building measures among states are limited.95
As Julian Lindley-French of the Netherlands Defence Academy recently 
observed, ‘all the ingredients exist for state competition, particularly over resources 
and life fundamentals, and particularly in East and South Asia’. Political–military 
competition in Asia could, Lindley-French noted, raise burden-sharing questions 
in transatlantic relations, particularly if the United States is obliged to dedicate 
more resources to the Asia–Pacific region. In these circumstances the European 
allies may need to ‘at least start to perform more credibly in keeping the famous 
“in and around Europe” reasonably stable so that NATO can help keep the U.S. 
strong in East and South Asia’.96
Stephan Frühling of the Australian National University and Benjamin Schreer 
of the Aspen Institute Germany recently argued cogently that
NATO as a whole must pay greater attention to power shifts in the Asia–Pacific and the 
implications for the Alliance … Any additional demands on US defence efforts in the 
Pacific would thus reinforce … US demands for better transatlantic burden-sharing. 
Finally, major conflict in the Asia–Pacific … would immediately raise the question of 
possible European participation—in much the same way as events in Afghanistan did so 
in 2001, in a previously unthinkable manner … The rise of China reinforces the need for 
transatlantic allies to discuss the geographic scope of NATO operations, the geographic 
priorities of European military engagement and the respective global security roles of 
NATO and the EU. This debate has to occur before urgent crises demand immediate and 
improvised responses.97
Whether the NATO allies will articulate more explicit policies on potential 
security challenges beyond the Euro-Atlantic region in the next Strategic Concept 
remains to be seen. In January 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said 
that ‘there is an awareness of the global nature of a lot of these problems, but a 
great reluctance to go beyond the geographic reach of NATO’. As she observed, 
in the face of ‘rogue regimes’ such as North Korea, ‘there are some who say this 
is too complicated, it is out of area, it is not our responsibility’.98 Events may, 
however, oblige the allies to grapple with the consequences of security challenges 
originating in the Middle East and the Asia–Pacific region.
95 Défense et sécurité nationale: le livre blanc (Paris: Odile Jacob/La Documentation Française, June 2008), pp. 34–5 
(author’s translation).
96 Julian Lindley-French, ‘Stratcon 2010: NATO’s strategic transformation’, in Boxhoorn and den Dunnen, eds, 
NATO’s new Strategic Concept, pp. 69–70.
97 Stephan Frühling and Benjamin Schreer, ‘NATO’s new Strategic Concept and US commitments in the Asia–
Pacific’, RUSI Journal 154: 5, Oct. 2009, pp. 98, 100, 102 (emphasis in original).
98 US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, ‘Remarks on the future of European security’, L’École Mili-
taire, Paris, 29 Jan. 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/136273.htm, accessed 7 Feb. 
2010.
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The risk of a non-Article 5 operation becoming a collective defence 
contingency
The danger that a non-Article 5 mission could turn into a collective defence 
contingency has been present since 1992, when the allies first undertook such 
operations in the Balkans. NATO forces operating in Afghanistan or some other 
location distant from their national territories could face attacks by a foreign 
government (as opposed to attacks by terrorists and insurgents), and these attacks 
might be conducted with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. The core 
security  interests of NATO or of specific allies could be affected by such attacks. 
If NATO forces came under attack by a foreign government outside the Article 6 
area, how would the allies respond? Should the allies say in the Strategic Concept 
that they would regard such an attack as an Article 5 case? If core security 
 interests held collectively by the allies came under attack, they might choose to 
treat it as an Article 5 case—even if the attack took place outside the Article 6 
area, and even if they had said nothing about such a contingency in the new 
Strategic Concept. Given that deterrence may require sending messages about 
vital  interests, however, should the NATO allies state that their vital interests 
include their armed forces when they are engaged in alliance operations beyond 
the geographical area  specified in Article 6?
A related question is whether the alliance should say something in the new 
Strategic Concept about nuclear protection for allied forces conducting opera-
tions outside the geographical area defined in Article 6. If a country attacked 
forces deployed by NATO outside NATO territory with a nuclear weapon, the 
alliance would have to consider whether to make a nuclear response. Should 
nuclear deterrence regarding such a contingency be a matter for possible national 
policy declarations by Britain, France and the United States, the alliance’s three 
nuclear weapon states? Or should there be a statement about such a contingency 
in the new Strategic Concept? Would it be sufficient to rely on the fact that there 
is an inherent nuclear dimension in the military operations undertaken by any 
nuclear weapon state?
In addressing these questions, it should be recognized that some doctrinal differ-
ences among NATO’s three nuclear weapon states persist, and that these three 
allies have resisted the formulation of an alliance policy on, for example, negative 
security assurances, on the grounds that such unilateral national undertakings are 
matters for the countries making them, not for their allies.99 Moreover, taking up 
the issue of nuclear protection outside NATO territory might reignite debates 
such as that which took place in France in the late 1970s concerning the implica-
tions of deploying nuclear weapons on aircraft-carriers operating far from the 
national homeland. Some French observers asked whether the nation’s nuclear-
armed aircraft-carriers should be regarded as protected by nuclear deterrence in 
the same way as the national homeland. Or should France’s nuclear deterrence 
capabilities be reserved for the protection of more narrowly defined vital inter-
99 Yost, ‘New approaches to deterrence in Britain, France, and the United States’, esp. pp. 111–14.
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ests, such as the national territory?100 Possible nuclear deterrence contingencies 
involving NATO allies in operations distant from alliance territory appear to have 
received little public attention.
Other issues
The allies may well examine issues in addition to the six listed above in composing 
the new Strategic Concept. For example, some allied observers have suggested that 
ensuring the security of energy supplies, or ‘energy security’, could be regarded 
as a collective defence matter falling under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
and that this should be explicitly stated in the new Strategic Concept. Others 
hold, however, that a statement similar to that employed in the 1999 Strategic 
Concept—that ‘Alliance security interests can be affected … by the disruption of 
the flow of vital resources’101—would be sufficient, without brandishing Article 
5 and an implicit threat of military action. According to another statement in 
the same paragraph of the 1999 Strategic Concept: ‘Arrangements exist within 
the alliance for consultation among the allies under Article 4 of the Washington 
Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their 
responses to risks of this kind.’102
In view of this proviso and similar statements elsewhere in the 1999 Strategic 
Concept,103 some allied observers favour regarding ‘energy security’ as a policy 
challenge to which the NATO allies might choose to seek a collective response 
in a particular situation. In their view, the allies could express political solidarity 
and coordinate their policies without presenting particular issues as by defini-
tion matters of collective defence that might require the threat or use of military 
force. Some allied observers would apply the same logic to certain other poten-
tial challenges, such as the risks that might be presented by pandemics or climate 
change. From this perspective, unless an adversary has deliberately released 
biological warfare agents or exploited changing environmental conditions in 
pursuit of unilateral advantage, pandemics and climate change may constitute 
global challenges rather than security tasks for the alliance. As with their responses 
to certain natural disasters, however, the allies could choose to supply logistical 
assistance, including transport of medical supplies and equipment, under NATO 
auspices. NATO might be one of several international organizations charged with 
cooperating to address such a challenge, and in other cases have no role, with 
responsibility being assigned by governments to UN agencies or other bodies. 
In yet other instances, however, the NATO allies might decide that the alliance 
100 For background, see David S. Yost, France’s deterrent posture and security in Europe, Part I: capabilities and doctrine, 
Adelphi Paper 194 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1984–5), p. 55.
101 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, para. 24.
102 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, para. 24.
103 As noted previously, the 1999 Strategic Concept stated that one of the alliance’s purposes is: ‘To serve, as 
provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations 
on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members’ secu-
rity, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern’: North Atlantic Council, 
Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, para. 10.
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framework would offer distinctive ‘added value’ and make it the preferred vehicle 
for the defence of their common security interests.
It should be recalled that, according to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
‘The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the 
territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is 
threatened.’ In an uncertain and turbulent world in which individual allies may 
face political intimidation, attempts at coercion and threats of limited aggression, 
rather than the threat of large-scale aggression aimed at territorial occupation 
and national defeat (as during the Cold War), NATO may in the future need to 
focus political consultations and military planning on Article 4 issues as well as 
Article 5 contingencies. The allies may therefore conclude that it would be wise 
to reconsider the meaning of Article 4 as well as Article 5 in the new international 
context. The allies might regard some contingencies—including the manipulation 
of resource supplies or certain forms of cyber-attack or assaults against satellites—
as Article 4 cases calling for security consultations. Moreover, the allies may find it 
in their interest to place more emphasis on developing the alliance’s potential as a 
proactive crisis management organization that strives to curtail emergent conflicts, 
despite the difficulties in moving beyond a reactive posture in a multinational, 
consensus-directed institution.
The wordsmiths drafting the alliance’s next Strategic Concept may find it 
advantageous to favour firm and unambiguous language about essential principles 
such as collective defence, but artful vagueness about the particular contingencies 
in which the allies may choose to apply these principles.104 Excessively specific 
language about what would constitute an Article 5 case or, more broadly, affect 
the alliance’s security interests might constrain the flexibility of the allies or even 
inadvertently weaken deterrence and invite aggression. Similarly, the specification 
in the Strategic Concept of political criteria for undertaking non-Article 5 opera-
tions, such as those that have been suggested for a hypothetical NATO engage-
ment in peacekeeping in the Middle East,105 might unduly constrict the alliance’s 
room for manoeuvre. With regard to the role of the UN Security Council, the 
allies may find it prudent simply to restate their understanding of its ‘primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’, as in the 
1999 Strategic Concept.106
104 As the foreign minister of Norway, Jonas Gahr Støre, recently observed, ‘we must hope that the Strategic 
Concept will not be a detailed micro-management document’: interview on 14 Jan. 2010, available at http://
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_60694.htm, accessed 19 Jan. 2010.
105 In 2005, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, then the NATO Secretary General, described ‘the necessary preconditions 
before envisaging any NATO contribution’ as including ‘a lasting peace agreement between Israelis and Pales-
tinians’, the support of these parties for ‘a NATO role in its implementation’ and ‘a UN mandate’: speech by 
NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in Israel, 24 Feb. 2005, available at http://www.nato.int/
docu/speech/2005/s050224a.htm, accessed 6 Feb. 2010.
106 ‘The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security and, as such, plays a crucial role in contributing to security and stability in the Euro-
Atlantic area’: North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, para. 15. The reference in the 1999 
Strategic Concept (para. 10) to the alliance’s readiness ‘case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with 
Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in 
crisis management, including crisis response operations’ constitutes another reference to the UN Security 
Council in the 1999 Strategic Concept. According to Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty, also known as 
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As some allied experts have observed, ‘thematizing’ and ‘regionalizing’ NATO’s 
purposes with great specificity could weaken the credibility of the Article 5 
commitment and undermine alliance cohesion. While the allies may well identify 
types of challenges affecting their security interests in the next Strategic Concept, 
they may also choose formulations that are sufficiently open to allow them some 
latitude in dealing with contingencies as they arise. As in the past, the Strategic 
Concept will be given practical meaning by the actions, investments and political 
will of the allies.
Conclusion: vision and political will to meet the new challenges?
The final question is, do the allies have the vision and political will to meet the new 
challenges? This is the most important question, and only the allies themselves can 
answer it. The picture is mixed, but there are firm grounds for hope.
The picture is mixed because there are several rather negative indicators, 
notably inadequate defence spending by some allies, national caveats by some allies 
on where, when and how their forces may be used in operations, minimal contri-
butions of forces and equipment to operations by some allies, and continuing 
disagreements among the allies as to how to rank their priorities and pursue their 
objectives. Moreover, some allies have failed to meet their capabilities commit-
ments in rotations of the NATO Response Force (NRF); and the allies have yet to 
develop more comprehensive common funding arrangements to support various 
activities, including contingency deployments by the NRF.107
It is not clear whether or how reviewing the Strategic Concept will contribute 
to the alliance’s renewal. The deliberation and drafting process regarding the 
alliance’s core purposes is important, but ultimately secondary to the exertion 
of political will by allied governments to formulate shared commitments and to 
follow through on them with investment and action. Without sufficient consensus 
on their collective purposes the allies may face increasing political fragmentation, 
continued inadequate defence spending, more shortfalls in meeting commit-
ments to operations and NRF rotations, and uncertainties among geographically 
exposed allies about the reliability of NATO collective defence commitments.
There are nonetheless solid grounds for hope because the allies have experi-
enced and surmounted—or managed to work around—similar problems in the 
past. Disagreements among the allies as to how to rank their priorities and pursue 
their objectives have characterized the alliance throughout its history. However, as 
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer pointed out in July 2009, at least in relation to some security 
the Washington Treaty, ‘This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the 
rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the 
primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.’ For 
a discussion of the alliance’s relationship to the UN Security Council, including the issues raised by NATO’s 
Operation Allied Force in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, see Yost, NATO and international organizations, pp. 31–41.
107 For a valuable discussion of this point, see Diego Ruiz Palmer, ‘From AMF to NRF: the roles of NATO’s 
rapid reaction forces in deterrence, defence and crisis-response, 1960–2009’, NATO Review, 2009, ‘NATO at 
60’, special issue, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/0902/090204/EN/index.htm, accessed 
6 Feb. 2010.
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challenges the post-Cold War security environment ‘does not present the kind of 
visible, tangible threat to all NATO Allies that we were used to in the Cold War’. 
He continued:
And this is perhaps the greatest challenge to our alliance. Why? Because it leads to a 
tendency to multiply the number of threats that NATO is called upon to deal with, with 
many allies having different perceptions according to their geographical location, their 
history or simply the last problem they faced—whether a terrorist attack or the break-
down of their computer systems or an instance of mass migration. The degree of solidarity 
that a nation wants to render today is very much at its own discretion. The test of our 
alliance, therefore, is in its ability to convince allies to show the necessary solidarity and to 
increase their willingness to share burdens equitably.108
De Hoop Scheffer’s statement that ‘The degree of solidarity that a nation 
wants to render today is very much at its own discretion’ serves as a commentary 
on the changed international context. It underscores the challenge for the allies 
in defining their common purposes. Article 5 has always provided for national 
discretion, in that the mutual defence pledge is qualified: ‘The Parties … agree 
that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them … will assist the Party or 
Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the 
other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to 
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area’ (emphasis added). 
In contrast with the Cold War situation, when an ‘opt-out’ from replying force-
fully to direct Soviet aggression was generally deemed implausible, the NATO 
allies now face threats and discern security imperatives in addition to the classical 
collective defence contingency of responding to ‘an armed attack’. They thus have 
greater latitude—and indeed must exercise judgement—in allocating resources to 
multiple security tasks.
Agreement on the alliance’s purposes is irrelevant without the political will to 
act on them, and in an alliance this leads inevitably to the question of burden-
sharing. The allies have disagreed since the founding of the alliance about how to 
define and measure equitable burden-sharing. All measures have shortcomings; 
and no measures—including quantitative measures—are regarded universally 
as objective and thorough. As measured by defence spending as a percentage of 
GDP, for example, burden-sharing within the alliance has always been uneven 
and unbalanced. However, this seemingly impartial gauge of burden-sharing does 
not, as many experts have pointed out, indicate anything about the efficiency 
with which funds are spent, nor does it spell out the specific purposes of the 
spending (for instance, personnel, equipment modernization, force transforma-
tion, or current operations and maintenance) or whether an ally employs its forces 
to support its own national priorities or NATO objectives or directs them to serve 
under other auspices (such as those of the UN, the EU, or an ad hoc coalition). 
Funds invested in force transformation—for instance, developing forces capable 
of expeditionary operations instead of simply static territorial defence—may 
108 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, ‘NATO: securing our future’.
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be regarded as contributions to burden-sharing just as valid as funds supporting 
current NATO operations. Some allies maintain, despite the doubts of critical 
allied observers, that development aid, technical assistance and humanitarian relief 
can also be considered contributions to alliance burden-sharing because they are 
intended to promote a more benign international security environment.
In other words, there is more to burden-sharing than current force levels in 
Afghanistan and the degree of engagement of these forces in combat operations. 
Moreover, with respect to the forces committed to missions in Afghanistan, some 
allowance must be made for differing national capabilities. It is difficult to make 
meaningful comparisons between, for example, contributions of light infantry, 
helicopters, special forces, and medical personnel and equipment.
The allies have not agreed how to identify, measure and compare contribu-
tions to NATO. Critics have accused some allies of abstaining from participation 
in certain NATO commonly funded equipment procurement budgets in order 
to protect their national military industries. Some of these same allies spend 
substantially more than others on military capabilities, however, and make large 
contributions to current operations. This circumstance reflects the long-standing 
capability gaps in the alliance—notably, those between the United States and the 
rest of the NATO allies, and those between certain European allies (especially 
France and the United Kingdom) and the other European allies.109
The capability gaps reflect the size of national economies to a considerable 
extent, but other factors—including the priority attached to military invest-
ments—are also involved. As Yves Boyer has noted, ‘Of the 27 EU countries, only 
six—France, Germany, UK, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands—accommodated 
for 82% of all EU defence spending. Put another way, 21 of the Union’s member 
states contribute between them a mere 18% of EU defence expenditure.’110 
According to Charles Grant, ‘only about a third of the [EU] member states take 
defence seriously and believe in intervening to solve security problems’.111 These 
observations about defence investments and attitudes in the EU are pertinent to 
the alliance because 21 EU members are NATO allies. In October 2009 US Assis-
tant Defense Secretary Alexander Vershbow pointed out that:
Consensus around collective defense cannot take place if there are perceptions that some 
members are true security providers while others are security consumers. In constant 
dollars, European defense spending has remained flat since 1998 … In fact, if it were not for 
some of our newest members, who have been working hard to achieve NATO spending 
targets, European defense spending levels would actually have declined since the 1990s. If 
NATO wants to remain relevant, we’re going to have to ensure that our resources match 
NATO missions.112
109 David S. Yost, ‘The NATO capabilities gap and the European Union’, Survival 42: 4, Winter 2000–2001; James 
Appathurai, ‘Closing the capabilities gap’, NATO Review, Autumn 2002.
110 Yves Boyer, ‘ESDP is badly damaged but it’s far from dead’, SDA discussion paper (Brussels: Security and 
Defence Agenda, April 2008), p. 16.
111 Charles Grant, ‘How to make Europe’s military work’, Financial Times, 16 Aug. 2009.
112 Vershbow, ‘Crafting the new Strategic Concept’.
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Restrictions on the use of forces and limited contributions of forces and equip-
ment by some allies represent other political facts of life. Although throughout 
NATO’s history some notable politicians have successfully sought to lead rather 
than to follow public opinion, allied governments generally cannot do more 
than their political base at home will permit. It is no accident that the forces of 
NATO allies in Afghanistan differ in their exposure to combat risks. Some NATO 
allies have stipulated that their forces be deployed and retained in less dangerous 
regions. Chris Patten, the Chancellor of Oxford University and a former 
European Commissioner for External Relations, wrote in November 2008 that 
‘the non-fighting NATO members should be prepared to join Britain, the Nether-
lands, Poland and Denmark in the trouble spots of the south and east’.113 Never-
theless, caveats on how their forces may be deployed remain the price exacted by 
some allies for participating at all.
Political leadership will remain indispensable if allies are to exert political 
will and increase their efforts. This will require more than increased reliance on 
common funding mechanisms for specific capabilities or purposes. However, such 
mechanisms could lead to more equitable burden-sharing, especially if the funding 
share were based on each ally’s GDP. Pooled logistics and greater investment in 
shared military capabilities might also enhance the collective effort.
Circumstances of necessity may motivate some allies to spend and do more. 
The fact remains that there is no alternative to NATO—not the OSCE, nor the 
EU, nor the UN—if the allies wish to secure their collective defence. Article 5 
will remain the bedrock of the alliance, and the allies are likely to continue to take 
a selective approach to undertaking non-Article 5 operations—especially after the 
experience of Afghanistan.
The real challenge for the NATO allies is to agree on their common purposes 
and to define a strategy to meet them, including a shared understanding on required 
resources and contributions. As James Golden pointed out in a classic study of the 
problems in analysing NATO burden-sharing, ‘Without agreement on alliance 
objectives and a strategy for meeting them, attempts to measure members’ contri-
butions, however precise and reliable, will mean little.’114 The question of the 
alliance’s ‘level of ambition’ in capabilities is inseparable from that of its agreed 
purposes and burden-sharing to achieve them.
113 Chris Patten, ‘How Europe can respond to Obama’, Financial Times, 26 Nov. 2008.
114 James R. Golden, NATO burden-sharing: risks and opportunities, Washington Paper 96 (New York: Praeger for 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1983), p. 19.
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